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Disqualification for Bias-
Indiana in Prespective
JOHN PHILIP UPDIKE
Preface
The nature of bias and prejudice and its disqualifying capacity in administrative
proceedings is, as a topic of examination, very broad. However, to narrow the scope
of this paper, certain necessary assumptions have been made. It has been necessary
to cast the following discussion in terms of the interested parties already before
the administrative boards of Indiana. This is a very severe assumption upon my part
since the claims of bias and prejudice will no doubt arise from only certain
interested parties and since both acts herein discussed limit standing. However,
I have attempted to present an overview of the types of challenges available to
certain parties to administrative hearings which may be raised to effectuate a change
in the composition of each of the boards. The questions of standing, of citizen
suits, and of powers to raise issues are, therefore, beyond the scope of this article.
INTRODUCTION
In 1943, the Indiana Legislature created a Stream Pollution Control Board;'
in 1961, it created an Air Pollution Control Board;2 and then in 1972, the Legislature
created an Environmental Management Board to coordinate and facilitate the efforts
of the air and stream boards.' The concern within the State Legislature for the
environment reaches back more than two decades, and it would appear that the policy
of the State is to become progressively more active in this area. However, the
effectiveness of State programs to protect the Hoosier environment is necessarily
dependent upon the dedication of those persons sitting on the various regulatory
boards to pursue the goals of clean air and water as recognized by the Indiana
legislature.
It is with this in mind that the composition of the Stream Pollution Control Board,
the Air Pollution Control Board, and to a lesser extent the Environmental Management
Board must be examined to determine whether the goals will be pursued vigorously.
This examination is not made with the intent to impugn the character of any of the
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members of the various boards, nor is it undertaken to challenge particular decisions
made or positions taken in the past by any of the boards. Rather, the examination
will focus on the possibility of challenges both to the individual members of the
boards as well as to the particular boards on the basis of bias and prejudice
of the majority of members on each board against the strict enforcement and
promotion of legislatively prescribed environmental standards.
The focus of concern concededly concentrates upon the present or past
employment of board members and the interests they represent and upon those
board members who are appointed to the boards as representatives of special interests
which have traditionally been hostile to enforcement of strong environmental
regulations. Therefore, the issue to be here considered is whether, in controversies
brought before the Stream Pollution Control Board and the Air Pollution Control
Board, these boards are open to attack and are subject to disqualification on the basis
of bas and prejudice as a consequence of the composition of each of the boards?
EXAMINATION OF RELEVANT INDIANA STATUTES
A brief examination of the statutory language creating and defining each of the
boards will put into proper perspective the subsequent analysis of how the
composition of the boards may be challenged.
Environmental Management Board
The Environmental Management Board has most recently been created for "the
establishment of priorities and coordination of the functions and services" of the air
and stream boards.4 This purpose indicates the strictly supervisory role of the
board which is further illustrated by the duty of the board to create a state program
for the "development and control of the environment to ensure for the present and
future generations the best possible air, water and land quality."5 In addition to
other programming duties, the board is delegated broad regulatory powers "to
preserve, protect and enhance the quality of the environment, to assure the
accomplishment of the comprehensive long-term program; and procure compliance
with its standards and regulations."' However, even with these broad regulatory
powers, the Environmental Management Board has not as of yet assumed the role of
promulgating standards and conducting hearings. Given the narrow scope of the
function of this board and the failure of the members to exercise review or rule-making
authority, further examination of this particular board will not be undertaken.
Air Pollution Control Board
The Air Pollution Control Board was created "to maintain the purity of the air
resource of the state, which shall be consistent with protection of the public health and
welfare and the public enjoyment thereof . . . through the prevention, abatement
and control of air pollution by all practical and economically feasible methods."7
The power to accomplish these goals has been vested in the board by the legislature to
the extent that the board may "make investigations, consider complaints and hold
hearings"8 and may "adopt and promulgate reasonable rules and regulations
consistent with the general intent and purposes of this act."9 In addition, the air
board is empowered to issue orders and determinations to effectuate the purposes of
this act and to enforce such orders, determinations, rules and regulations under
the Indiana Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act, hereafter referred
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to as the A.A.A.'o Therefore, primary responsibility for enforcing federal and
state standards in air pollution control has been delegated to this board.
The Air Pollution Control Board is composed of seven members of whom one is
ex officio, the secretary of the Indiana State Board of Health, while the remaining six
(a physician, graduate engineer, and representatives of: agriculture, industry,
municipal government, and the general public) are appointed by the governor."
The discharge of contaminants into the air explicitly violates public policy," and the
board is empowered to "hold a hearing with respect to any suspected violation
of the provisions of this act. . . .'"' Special provision is made for the Indiana A.A.A.
to apply to the hearing proceedings as well as the appeal process.' Pursuant thereto,
aggrieved parties may appeal decisions by the air board by alleging that the
decision is:
(1) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
accordance with law; or
(2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity; or
(3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations, or
short of statutory right; or
(4) without observance of procedure required by law; or
(5) unsupported by substantial evidence.'"
"On such judicial review such court shall not try or determine said cause de novo,
but the facts shall be considered and determined exclusively upon the record filed
with said court pursuant to this [A.A.A.J. " The intent underlying the A.A.A.
would appear to be one of reliance on the expertise of the air board while affording
parties protection from wrong decisions.
Stream Pollution Control Board
The purpose for creation of this board is stated in terms of "jurisdiction to
control and prevent pollution in waters of this state with any substance which
is deleterious to the public health or to the prosecution of any industry or lawful
occupation, or whereby any fish life or any beneficial animal or vegetable life may be
destroyed, or the growth or propagation thereof prevented or injuriously affected."' 7
To effectuate this jurisdiction, the stream board has the power to determine and
pass water quality standards, issue regulations and orders, and conduct hearings on
alleged violations." In addition, the board may also conduct investigations and
inspections in relation to water quality anywhere within the State."
To violate standards or regulations created by the stream board or to contribute
to the pollution of State waters is unlawful,20 and specific provision is made for
agency hearing upon notice of the violation and order to cease and abate.'
The interesting aspect, however, of this act is the provision for enforcement of an
agency decision. For failure to comply with the decision, the agency may file
in court for enforcement, and thereupon, either party may request that the civil action
be tried de novof" However, the act makes no provision for judicial review of the
agency decision on petition of an aggrieved party. The argument has been made
that an appeal should follow the above enforcement provision and be de novo.
But such argument has been rejected, and judicial review on appeal from the agency
100
decision follows the A.A.A. provisions discussed above in regard to the air
pollution control board.23
The stream board is composed of seven members. Three of the members are
ex officio: Secretary of the Indiana State Board of Health, Director of the Department
of Conservation, and Lieutenant-governor. The remaining four members are
appointed by the Governor, but no specific qualifications are prescribed.
COMPOSITION OF THE BOARDS
Having summarized the most significant aspects of the statutory provisions
relating to the topic herein considered, it is necessary to recognize the individuals
who are on the air and stream boards and their respective backgrounds and/or
interests. For the reasons noted above in discussing the Environmental Management
Board, the members of that board will not be reviewed.
The Air Pollution Control Board is composed of seven members, six of whom are
appointed by the Governor. The following is a list of the present members and an
identification of the interests they represent.24
Health Commissioner, State Board of Health (ex officio); Chairman, an
Indianapolis attorney (representative of the general public); Vice Chairman,
a graduate engineer for a large manufacturing concern; a steel company
executive (representative of industry); an official of the Indiana Farm
Bureau (representative of agriculture); a retired public official
(representative of municipal government); and an assistant professor
of ophthalmology, a physician.
The Stream Pollution Control Board is composed of seven members, four of
whom are appointed by the Governor without restriction or limitation. The following
is a list of the present members and an identification of the interests they represent."
Health Commissioner of the State Board of Health, the Lieutenant-
governor, and the Director of the Indiana Department of Natural
Resources (ex officio); two business executives, an attorney with an
engineering background, and a retired engineer.
Examination of the above lists reveals that the only person representing both a
specific environmental interest and knowledge in the area is the Director of the
Department of Natural Resources. A representative of the general public is required
on the air board, but it is unclear how he is qualified to represent such an interest.
The remaining members exhibit what would appear to be a conspicuous lack of
expertise in the field of environmental concerns. While the attitudes of the various
individuals cannot be revealed matter-of-factly, it would seem reasonable to
acknowledge that the vast majority of members have a continuing relationship with
interests often in conflict with environmental standards. In fact, both boards
seem to be stacked with representatives of interests most likely to be affected by
regulation under the statutes, and this over-balance is due in part to the Legislature.
DISQUALIFICATION FOR BIAS AND PREJUDICE
Generally, there are four broad classifications of bias recognized in the field
of administrative law: bias or prejudice regarding a "point of view about issues
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of law or policy," a "bias or prejudgment concerning issues of fact about the parties
in a particular case," "partiality" or a "personal bias or prejudice" as represented
by an "attitude for or against a party as distinguished from issues of law or policy,"
and an "interest" in the proceeding." Concern about possible bias is directed
to the ability of agency members to function in a fair and objective manner.
"Due process involves the right of persons to be heard, so far as feasible, in all
matters affecting their individual interests together with the objective weighing of
relevant factors by the deciding authority in reaching conclusions.""
This necessarily leads to the question of what standards of fairness are to be
applied generally to administrative hearings. Justice Cardozo directed himself
to this question, saying,
Regulatory commissions have been invested with broad powers within the
sphere of duty assigned to them by law. Even in quasi-judicial proceedings
their informed and expert judgment exacts and receives a proper deference
from courts when it has been reached with due submission to constitutional
restraints. (cites omitted) Indeed, much that they do within the realm
of administrative discretion is exempt from supervision if those restraints
have been obeyed. All the more insistent is the need, when power has
been bestowed so freely, that the "inexorable safeguard" (cite omitted) of a
fair and open hearing be maintained in its integrity. (cites omitted)
The right to such a hearing is one of "the rudiments of fair play" (cite
omitted) assured to every litigant by the Fourteenth Amendment as a
minimal requirement. (cites omitted) There can be no compromise on the
footing of convenience or expediency, or because of a natural desire to
be rid of harassing delay, when that minimal requirement has been
neglected or ignored.' 8
Justice Cardozo's position has been followed and expanded in the development of
minimum requirements for administrative proceedings. In National Labor Relations
Board v. Phelps," the court recognized that the requirement of an "unbiased
and non-partisan trier of the facts" is the same for both administrative and judicial
proceedings. But the court also went on to say that if any distinction did exist,
it would be that the "requirement that the trier be impartial and unconcerned
in the result applies more strictly to an administrative adjudication where many of
the safeguards which have been thrown around the court proceedings have, in the
interest of expedition and a supposed administrative efficiency, been relaxed." 0
According to the court in the Phelps case, once there is evidence of bias and prejudice
on the part of the trier, panel, or board as the case may be, the judgment may not
be preserved even if supported by some evidence because of the taint of unfairness."
In Indiana, the Supreme Court has recently said in denying enforcement of an order
issued by the Board of Public Works and Safety that, "[ljitigants are entitled
to an impartial tribunal whether it consists of one man or twenty and there is no
way which we know of whereby the influence of one upon the others can be
quantitatively measured." 3'
It is within this context that the above mentioned types of bias must be examined
to determine if any will be fatal to the capacity of a member of an administrative
agency to sit in a hearing. The first type of bias involves purely personal views
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on issues of law or policy. Traditionally, this has not been a disqualifying bias.
"A bias, if it is to be a disqualification, must mean something more than an ideological
bent: if it meant no more, the creation of a bench before which cases could be
tried or appeals could be argued would indeed become difficult if not wholly
impossible."" Applying this to the question of bias and prejudice of members of
the Indiana air and stream boards, it would obviously be insufficient to allege that
certain members personally do not believe in the importance of environmental
regulation, and thus something more would have to be shown.
A second type of bias which may be disqualifying concerns the prejudgment
of issues of fact in a particular case. This, too, is a very narrow type of bias.
To be disqualified pursuant to this type of challenge would require comments and
actions on the part of individual members indicating that, upon certain facts,
objectivity would be nonexistent. It should be noted that involvement of an
administrative agency in investigation prior to hearings on possible violations does
not create such bias or prejudice. Such would be official contact with the facts
and would not result in a deprivation of due process."
A third type of bias more closely related to the concern of prejudgment on the
basis of background and occupational interests is that of partiality. Often, this
type of bias is represented by a relationship of some nature to one of the parties or
individuals or a well-focused antagonism toward a party." "Personal prejudice-an
attitude of favoritism or animosity toward a particular party-disqualifies when
it is substantial."36 Such was the case when the court in Phelps, supra," refused to
enforce the N.L.R.B. order saying that "the examiner exhibited resentment and
spleen toward them and gave expression to his pre-determined opinion of their guilt
on the charges he was supposed to be trying."
Partiality and predetermination of the questions would, therefore, seem to follow
from strong past and present relationships with special interests which are subject
to regulation and are primarily concerned about the scope of enforcement of
state and federal standards as in the areas of air and water pollution. It has already
been noted that all but perhaps four members of the air and stream boards in
Indiana represent interests affected by the enforcement of environmental standards.
Because of the interest representation, the occupational backgrounds, and the attitudes
of the persons herein discussed, danger of the natural consequence of partiality
toward related interests and parties may be significant enough to support challenges
of bias and prejudice directed at individual members.
It must be noted that in the case of Mikus v. U.S.," the court refused to excuse
jurors "for cause due to certain occupational or other special relationships which
might bear directly or indirectly on the circumstances of a given case" without a
"showing of actual bias or prejudice." However, in the case of the air and stream
boards in Indiana, present and past occupational relationships are so intertwined
with personal interests of individual members of the air and stream boards that
parties representing environmental interests in licensing and permit cases and
in hearings on violations of standards or regulations should be permitted to challenge
individual members on the basis of partiality. "Disqualifications of judges and
of administrators-does not come to pass because one knows that the hearing will
be unfair, but because it might be unfalr and it is much better to avoid the risk
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if one can."" Therefore, an appropriate challenge founded upon this type of
bias might be sustained.
A fourth type of bias is represented by an interest in the outcome of the
proceedings. Analogized to the judicial process, "the due process clause forbids a
trial before a judge who has a direct, personal, pecuniary interest in the outcome.""'
On this basis, it may be possible to examine the present and past occupational
relationships to determine if a particular decision in a case will in one way or
another benefit any of the members of the air or stream boards. If so, a challenge
of bias would necessarily be sustained.
This type of bias has been expanded in Johnson v. Michigan Milk Marketing
Board4' to sustain a constitutional challenge to an entire board on the basis of
its composition. In that case, the Michigan legislature created the Milk Marketing
Board to be composed of the Commissioner of Agriculture and four members to
be appointed by the governor: two milk producers, one milk distributor, and one
representative of consumers. The board proceeded to set minimum prices to be paid
to producers by distributors and the minimum prices to be charged to consumers.
Then it attempted to enforce these regulations against Johnson. Johnson, a
milk distributor, alleged that a majority of the board had a direct pecuniary interest
in these matters, and the court found in fact that a majority of the members
were judging their own cause thus precluding an impartial hearing and violating
the requirements of due process. 2 Consequently, the court held that "(in order
that the administration of the milk industry may be conducted in a fair and impartial
manner, it is essential that the Board be impartial in its composition. The act
is fatally defective in its provision for the appointment of the personnel of the
Board."4 All orders of the Board were vacated and the act was declared
unconstitutional on the basis of the composition of the Board as tested by the
principle of due process.
The Johnson case was immediately criticized 4 and has since been distinguished,
although not overruled, by the Michigan courts." In fact, the court in Sponick v.
City of Detroit Police Dept. said "(djue process is satisfied if the hearing is
conducted by someone who did not participate in the decision under review.""
However, Johnson would appear to still be good law for the proposition that
rule-making authority cannot be vested in agencies in which a majority of the
members will have a pecuniary interest and will be regulating for their own interest."
In Indiana, Lucas v. State" is the closest case on the point involving the denial
of a license to a chiropractor by the Board of Medical Registration and Examination.
In dismissing the constitutional challenge which followed the Johnson line of attack,
the court said that it could find no direct financial interest. The Court also said
"(t~he composition of the Board of Medical Registration and Examination,
and the manner in which it may function, is a legislative question, and not judicial,
(cite omitted), the wisdom of which is a matter to be determined by the
Legislature. (cites omitted) So long as the Constitution is not offended, we may
not interfere with its enactments." 49 HOWeVEr, a constitutional challenge to the
air and stream boards may still be possible under a Johnson type analysis in cases
involving the rule-making functions of the two boards as opposed to their licensing
and permit functions since over half of the members of the boards represent
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interests which will benefit directly or indirectly from lax regulation and enforcement.
It would be necessary to argue an unconstitutional delegation of the powers to
promulgate rules and regulations to individuals directly involved with specific
parties or interests to he regulated. Such an argument would appear to be a logical
extension of the direct interest principle of Johnson."o
However, as already noted, Johnson arose through agency action to enforce
compliance with the regulations duly promulgated. Johnson was in fact a member of
the class subject to regulation, and he opposed the enforcement of regulations
adverse to his interests. His challenge was upheld on the basis that the Legislature
placed power in persons on the board who had pecuniary interests in the particular
regulations complained of by Johnson. It would appear difficult to extend this
rationale directly to the Indiana air and stream acts. Such a constitutional challenge
to delegation of legislative authority could not arise because a case of the air or
stream board being pecuniarily interested in strict enforcement of environmental
standards (except in a most tangential way) against a polluter is absurd. Rather, a
case challenging the constitutionality of delegation of legislative authority as
prescribed by the Legislature will have to arise with a party seeking strict adherence
to existing standards before one of the boards. Pursuant to a refusal to enforce,
the constitutionality of the particular Act could be challenged in an appeal.
The problem here is one of getting the party pressing for strict regulation before
the board initially.
This issue directed at possible pecuniary interest of the individual board
members may be eliminated, at least in regard to the stream board, if Indiana is
allowed to administer the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Act
within the State. Membership upon the stream board would then be governed by the
following federal regulation:
Each State or interstate agency participating in the N.P.D.E.S. shall insure
that any board or body which approves N.P.D.E.S. permit applications
or portions thereof shall not include as a member, any person who receives, or
has during the previous 2 years received, a significant portion of his income
directly or indirectly from permit holders or applicants for a permit ...
(d) For the purposes of this section, the term "income" includes retirement
benefits, consultation fees, and stock dividends. 51
Doctrine of Necessity
Even if bias is discovered which would disqualify certain individuals on the
boards, disqualification might not be permissible if the boards would be disqualified
and no alternative forums existed under law.52 Such would be the case regarding
the license and permit functions of the air and stream boards. But it does not appear
that even in cases where no other forum is available, the boards are prohibited
from ruling on the qualifications of their members except to the extent that a quorum
must be preserved. In a case, however, involving a constitutional challenge, the
doctrine of necessity would appear to be unavailable to preserve the boards for
the reason that the doctrine cannot and was not designed to counter-balance such
a defect. In such a case, the composition of the boards would have to be revised.
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Procedure
The allegation of bias must be presented at the outset of the administrative
hearing although "[o]3bjections going to the personal attitudes of the tribunal
will not be heard prior to a final determination."" If disqualification for antecedent
or current relationships is denied, then upon the conclusion of the administrative
hearing appeal should be taken under the A.A.A." While judicial review "is limited
to a consideration of whether or not the order was made in conformity with proper
legal procedure, is based upon substantial evidence, and does not violate any
constitutional, statutory, or legal principle . . ."" the court must determine whether
there was bias and consequently ". . . whether in fact the hearing has been
unfair."" It would appear that the constitutional challenge could only be raised upon
judicial review because the air and stream boards cannot entertain such a challenge.
CONCLUSIONS
The statutory purposes for creation of the air and stream boards identify
legislative concern for protection of the environment. Because of strong professional
ties, both present and antecedent, many members on the Indiana environmental
boards represent special interests closely aligned with industry and commerce
and may project their own biases to the detriment of the environmental policies and
regulations set forth in the air and stream acts. There can be no doubt that to
a certain extent accommodation must be made between environmental pursuits and
practicality. However, the composition of the Indiana boards reveals almost a
complete lack of environmental expertise while representatives of special interests
traditionally opposed to strict environmental standards constitute a large percentage
of the membership. Various challenges predicated on bias and unfairness have
been sketched above, but pressures brought to bear on the Governor who makes
appointments and on the State Legislature for the express purpose of revising
the prescribed membership schemes may be more fruitful. But whatever the approach
taken, the goal should be to invest the power in environmental experts to promote
the express policies and provisions of the acts herein discussed.
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ch. 214, §1, p. 624). [hereinafter cited as I.C. and I.A.S.)
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47 See, Southeast Milk Sales Association, Inc. v. Swarigen, 290 F.Supp. 292 (N.D. No. Car., 1968),
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72 S.C. 366.
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in the N.P.D.E.S. to protect against the direct pecuniary interests of administrative agency
members as in Johnson. Specific federal regulation against such direct interest only reinforces
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51 40 C.F.R. §124.94.
5
'Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F.2d 351 (10th Cir., 1936), for the rule that "disqualification will not be
permitted to destroy the only tribunal with power in the premises."
"Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, Little, Brown and Co., 1965, p. 441 note 65.
See also, S.E.C. v. R.A. Holman, 323 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir., 1963).
5 4I.C. 4-22-1-14, (I.A.S. 63-3014).
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